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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the development and trend of countertrade 
transactions and assess their utility in state development by first examining the 
emergence and current trend of countertrade practice. It will then provide background 
on underdevelopment in Congo before presenting a case study on the Sino-
Congolese countertrade deal. In this, both China and Congo’s stakes will be 
discussed, along with a comparison of this deal with another countertrade deal China 
has undertaken with a developing state. An examination of countertrade’s role in state 
development will follow. Finally, points will be made regarding some adverse effects 
of countertrade and its impression on the international community as a whole.  
Keywords: Countertrade, Democratic Republic of Congo, China, Barter, Sicomines, 
Development   
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Introduction 
To many developing states, countertrade practices are not just an alternative 
means of economic growth; they are crucial to state development. Countertrade is 
unique in that it necessitates an “undertaking of commitments that usually […creates] 
an added value for the [economies] of the countries involved in the transaction.”1 Since 
the 1970s, countertrade has increased in popularity, shifting its image from that of an 
archaic means of trade used only because money had not yet existed, to a strategic 
and normalised trade mechanism.2 These days, countertrade is used for a multitude 
of reasons, including promoting exports, trading surplus goods, establishing future 
markets, improving international relations, and preserving hard currency, among other 
reasons.3 In fact, up to 25% of international business transactions are due to 
countertrade practices, though this figure is not universally agreed upon.4  
While countertrade may occur between two developed states, this paper will 
focus on countertrade transactions that involve developing states. This paper studies 
the barter deal between China and the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC” or 
“Congo”) as the deal is a textbook example of modern-day countertrade involving 
developing states.5 
This study aims to examine the development and trend of countertrade 
transactions and assess their utility in state development by first examining the 
emergence and current trend of countertrade practices in section two. A background 
on Congo and the events leading up to its current state of underdevelopment will be 
provided in section three. Section four will present a case study on the Sino-Congolese 
countertrade deal, wherein both China and Congo’s stakes will be discussed. This 
section will also include a comparative case brief on China’s trade deal with Sri Lanka. 
An examination of countertrade’s role in state development will follow in section five. 
 
1 Gloria Esteban de la Rosa, “International Countertrade - Rules and Practices” (2011) 2(15) 
International Journal of Business and Social Science 273, 273 
2 Abdolhhossein Shiravi-Khozani, “The Legal Aspects of International Countertrade with Reference to 
the Australian Legal System” (Thesis 1997), 1 
3 Sak Onkvisit and John Shaw, International Marketing: Strategy and Theory (Routledge, 2008), 
Chapter 17 
4 Peter Quirk, Issues in International Exchange and Payments Systems (IMF 1995), 27; GATT 
Secretariat estimated 5% in the 90s; British Department of Trade Industry estimated 15%  
5 Whether China is a developing state is questionable. 
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Finally, points will be made about some adverse effects of countertrade and its 
impression on the international community as a whole in section six.  
While there are numerous reasons for which a state may engage in 
countertrade deals, only their use vis-à-vis state development will be addressed. In 
considering their utility, we may find that countertrade transactions are a double-edged 
sword in terms of their implications for developing states, the international trade order, 
and morality in commerce. 
The Emergence and Development of Countertrade 
Countertrade is not technically a new way of trading, as its existence predates 
the conception of money, albeit in simplified barter form.6 During the 1970s and 80s, 
countertrade increased in use to finance trade and promote commerce whenever hard 
currency was scarce.7 Since then, countertrade has been used whenever currency 
was scarce or other forms of conventional market trade were impossible.8  
Modern-day countertrade is not simply a mechanical exchange of goods; it 
entails additional countertrade commitments which are to be assumed and negotiated 
by the parties involved, however imbalanced their bargaining powers are.9 Because 
of the cooperation-based and sometimes seemingly “hostage-based” nature of the 
transaction contract, the parties involved are insured against any risks that may 
manifest.10 Besides, countertrade agreements need not be fair; if parties want fair 
terms, they ought to first negotiate and agree on them in their bilateral contracts.11 
According to Gloria Esteban de la Rosa, there has been a shift in the dynamics 
of world economies toward privatization and deregulation, as well as an overall 
increase in competition in the international market.12 Thanks to this shift, importer 
states have chosen trade practices that “increase their productiveness and their 
marketing abilities as well as decrease their budget deficit and public sector 
 
6 Shiravi-Khozani (n2) 1 
7 George Dalton, “Barter”, (2016) 16(1) Journal of Economic Issues 181, 189 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rosa (n1) 273 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
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expenses.”13 The result is that more and more foreign exporters have been 
undertaking countertrade commitments that “take the form of transfers of 
manufacturing experience or knowledge, creation of local employment and acquisition 
of new projects and investments for the exporter” instead of simply engaging in goods-
for-goods or goods-for-money exchanges.14 This shift has birthed new countertrade 
forms like buyback and build-operate-transfer.15 While there are a fair number of 
countertrade forms available,16 the present discussion will only introduce barter, as it 
is relevant to the case study that will follow. 
Barter 
According to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, barter 
entails “a contract involving a two-way exchange of specified goods in which the 
supply of goods in one direction replaces […] the monetary payment for the supply of 
goods in the other direction.”17 More precisely, goods and services of similar value are 
exchanged between the contracting parties without formal crediting by financial 
institutions or the need to transfer money.18 All that is required of the parties is to 
negotiate a mutually beneficial contract and directly exchange the goods or services. 
Barter deals are typically used for short-term, lower-value deals, so are thought to not 
be useful for larger-scale projects.19  
The Congolese Tragedy 
Ascertaining how countertrade can help Congo develop will first require an 
understanding of Congo’s interest in engaging in countertrade. Given its geography, 
great age dependency ratio20 and wealth of natural resources valued at $24 trillion,21 
it is both ironic and tragic that Congo continues to top the list as the world’s poorest 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.; also Michael Rowe, Countertrade, (3rd edn, Euromoney Books 1997), 20-21 
15 Scott Lochner, “Guide to Countertrade and International Barter”, (1985) 19(3) The International 
Lawyer 725, 727 
16 Other forms of countertrade include counter-purchase, offset, switch trading, swap, and evidence 
accounts 
17 A/CN.9/SER.B/3, 8 
18 Shiravi-Khozani (n2) 13 
19 Pompiliu Verzariu, International Countertrade, (US Department of Commerce, 1992), [2] 
20 97.25% of citizens are of working age, according to the World Bank 
21 Connor Keowen, “Rich in Resources But Why is the Democratic Republic of Congo Poor?” (The 
Borgen Project, 1 August <https://borgenproject.org/why-is-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-poor/> 
accessed 18 December 2018 
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state.22 Since its independence in 1960, decades of social and political strife have 
debilitated the country and stifled its economic potential. As is the case with most sub-
Saharan African states, most of the blame can be assigned to colonisation.23 Congo’s 
wealth of resources ought to translate to a wealthy economy, but it has proven a curse 
to the DRC for it has made it vulnerable to continued exploitation—especially by its 
former coloniser, imperial Belgium.24 
Congo’s current state of underdevelopment is also attributable to social and 
political instability caused by years of constant shifts of dictatorial rule after the 
assassination of former president Patrice Lumumba in 1961,25 and a rebellion directly 
linked to Congo’s refugee crisis that saw an influx of hutu refugees from Rwanda in 
the 1990s.26 The country has also been plagued by the 22-year presidential reign of 
the Kabila kleptocracy.27 It is suspected that current president, Joseph Kabila, has 
siphoned off millions of foreign aid, in return giving the state’s natural resources to 
investors and foreign aiders, much to the expense of Congolese citizens.28 All of these 
factors have contributed to an overall reduction of “national output and governmental 
revenue, and [increase in] external debt.”29 Although this issue has improved in the 
past decade as a result of economic reform projects like the 2002 Enhanced Interim 
Program,30 progress remains slow because of bureaucratic inefficiency, patronage, 
corruption and inconclusive legal frameworks.31 
The aforementioned problems, along with the Congolese government’s 
inadequate use of its natural resources and unsatisfactory internal systems (e.g. 
educational system), have effected “pervasive poverty, political turmoil, security 
issues…and inadequate infrastructure”32—the same hurdles that have made Congo 
 
22 “Congo, Dem. Rep.”, (World Bank) <https://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep> accessed 
2 January 2019, GDP of $457.84 per capita (2017) 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., though Kabila lost the December 2018 presidential election 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002 (DRC), [9], [94]; Enhanced Interim Program 2001 
(DRC) 
31 “The World Factbook: The Democratic Republic of Congo”, (CIA) 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> accessed 2 January 2019 
32 “Africa Gearing Up: Democratic Republic of Congo” (PWC) publication 
<https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/africa-gearing-up.pdf>, 31 
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unattractive to foreign investors. Because Congo receives few mutually beneficial 
trade opportunities from international investors, it continues on an incessant cycle of 
stagnant underdevelopment.33 Hence, for Congo, engaging in a countertrade deal with 
China represents a chance to significantly develop the state. 
A Barter Deal of Epic Proportion 
Sino-Congolese relations did not manifest out of nowhere, though such 
relations were at best peripheral before 2006.34 Relations between the two states were 
elevated as a result of Joseph Kabila’s Cinq Chantiers reconstruction program,35 
comprising five sectors in desperate need of reform:  “infrastructure, job creation, 
education, water and electricity, and health.”36 In order to fund the program, the Kabila 
government agreed to an initial $9 billion barter deal with China, which was finalised 
in 2009.37 The Kabila government would allocate its exploitation licenses 9681 and 
9682 (cobalt and copper mines) to a Chinese consortium led by state-owned China 
Railway Engineering Corporation in exchange for the consortium’s commitment to 
“[securing] the financing of $6.565 billion worth of infrastructure projects of a public 
goods nature, such as [universities], roads and hospitals, and invest about $3 billion 
in the mining project itself.”38 In addition, the consortium would reimburse its main 
financer, China Exim Bank (CEB), for the cost of financing the infrastructure with the 
revenue the mines of the joint-venture (“Sicomines”) generates.39 
While the agreement presents benefits to the parties involved, we must 
question whether the reality is truly ‘win-win’. Ascertaining this will require a synopsis 
of both parties’ stakes.  
China’s Stakes 
 
33 World Bank (n22) 
34Johanna Jansson, “Views from the ‘Periphery’: The Manifold Reflections of China’s Rise in the DR 
Congo” in X Li and S Christensen (eds), The Rise of China: The Impact on Semi-Periphery and 
Periphery Countries (Aalborg Universitetsforlag 2012), 173-203; Sino-Congolese relations pre-2006 
mainly consisted of China giving gifts to Congo and commissioning troops to MONUC  
35 Radio France International (RFI), “Les chantiers de Kabila” (2006) 
36 David Landry, “The Risks and Rewards of Resource-for-Infrastructure deals: Lessons from the 
Congo’s Sicomines Agreement” (2018) China Africa Research Initiative No.16/2018, 
<http://www.sais-cari.org/publications/> accessed on 4 December 2018, 4 
37 Ibid., later reduced to $6 billion 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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According to professors K.H. Butts and Brent Bankus, “China’s economic 
growth has exceeded its domestic resource base,” thereby rendering it dependent on 
“imports for critical supplies of fuel and minerals.” 40 This dependency has driven the 
economic powerhouse to do business in Africa, in particular Congo, which teems with 
energy resources. 
Many are sceptical of China’s involvement in Africa, fearing that China’s 
seemingly ‘no strings attached’ deals actually include strings that will always result in 
debt for the receiving party41. Contrary to this view, in 2009, Johanna Jansson reported 
that “Chinese private companies operating globally are…pushed abroad by the 
saturation in the Chinese market rather than by any Beijing-coordinated expansion 
plan.”42 Private Chinese companies doing business in the DRC have little to no direct 
links to the Chinese government.43 This means that if the Chinese consortium does 
not find as much cobalt and copper as it expected,44 it will bear the brunt of the failure 
and may run into trouble with CEB. Also if the political climate in Congo worsens, 
perhaps in the event of another revolt, then Congo may be unable to fulfil its part of 
the deal.   
Congo’s Stakes 
Of course, Congo has much to gain from the barter deal. An infrastructure deal 
of this magnitude will hopefully mean a more competitive future for the country. 
However, it has now been nearly ten years since the deal was finalised, and progress 
in various infrastructure projects has stagnated considerably since 2012.45 While it 
may seem as though Congo has little to lose given how much it has asked of China, 
infrastructure can wear down fairly quickly over time if it is not well-maintained.46 Thus, 
 
40 Kent Butts and Brent Bankus, ‘China’s Pursuit of Africa’s Natural Resources’, (2009) 1(9) CSL 1, 1 
41 Jansson (n34), 31 
42 Johanna Jansson, “The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the DRC’s International 
Relations” (SAIIA, 2011), 6 
43 Johanna Jansson, “DRC: Chinese Investment in Katanga” (Pambazuka News, 2010) 
<https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/drc-chinese-investment-katanga> accessed 8 January 
2019,  
44 “Copper Reserves at China's Sicomines in Congo Less Than Hoped,” (Reuters, 24 May 2013 
<http://www.theafricareport.com/Reuters-Feed/Copper-reserves-at-China-s-Sicomines-in-Congo-less-
than-hoped.html>accessed 7 January 2019 
45 Landry (n36) 14 
46 e.g. potholes, low-quality university buildings, etc. 
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if the Congolese government has neither the skill and expertise nor the finances to 
perform the necessary maintenance, deeper national debt will ensue.  
Try as the World Trade Organization (WTO) may to classify China as a 
developing state,47 the reality is that its economy is the second strongest in the world.48 
Compared to Congo, the poorest state, the juxtaposition of bargaining powers is 
remarkable not only in terms of its inequity: the consequences of the deal’s potential 
failure would be felt more dearly in the DRC. 
Whether the benefits Congo will receive truly outweigh these risks will depend 
on whether Congo progresses in the areas laid out in Cinq Chantiers and so breaks 
its resource ‘curse’. The legacy of the Sino-Congolese deal remains to be seen.  
A Comparison 
There are, however, completed trade deals between China and other 
developing states that may give us insight into what Congo may experience. Of 
considerable interest is China’s financing deal with Sri Lanka. In 2010, China agreed 
to loan Sri Lanka $1.5 billion to finance Hambantota, an unviable port in Sri Lanka.49 
In the end, the Sri Lankan government ceded the port and the 15,000 acres of land 
surrounding it to China for 99 years because it was unable to pay its debt.50 
Alas, this debt trap is not a bizarre incident. In a 2018 report published by the 
US White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, it was proclaimed that 
“China uses a predatory ‘debt trap’ model of economic development and finance that 
proffers substantial financing to developing countries.”51 Researchers, journalists, and 
policymakers have called this phenomenon ‘debt trap diplomacy’. What occurs in ‘debt 
trap diplomacy’ is that states will engage in a bilateral agreement in which the creditor 
state will give excessive credit to the debtor state with the intention of taking political 
 
47 World Trade Organization, “Formation of Asian Group of Developing Members” (27 March 2012) 
WT/GC/COM/6 
48 “The World Bank in China”, The World Bank, 
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>accessed 2 January 2019 
49 Jamie Tarabay, “With Sri Lankan Port Acquisition, China Adds Another ‘Pearl’ to its ‘String’”, (CNN, 
5 February 2018) <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/03/asia/china-sri-lanka-string-of-pearls-
intl/index.html> accessed 10 January 2019 
50 Ibid. 
51 “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the 
United States and the World” publication (White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 
June 2018), 1 
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or economic concessions from the debtor state when it inevitably becomes unable to 
pay off its debts;52 hence Sri Lanka’s concession of its port. According to the Center 
for Global Development’s March 2018 report on China’s Belt and Road Initiative,53 
which many have deemed an embodiment of ‘debt trap diplomacy’, the following eight 
states are highly vulnerable to debt distress from trade deals with China: Djibouti, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Montenegro, Laos, Kyrgyzstan, and the Maldives.54 
Each of these states owe China the equivalent of between 40% and 90% of their 
GDPs.55 Though these examples give weight to critiques of China’s ‘diplomatic’ 
strategy, it is important to be mindful of the anti-China tone used in highlighting the 
strategy, as the policymakers who spoke out against China’s latest ‘diplomatic’ tactic 
likely either publically censured China out of disagreement with its recent economic 
policies or came from states that have hypocritically used the tactic before in different 
forms.56 
Indeed, China is not the only state to adopt this strategy. Powerful economic 
forces like France and the UK used ‘debt trap diplomacy’ for over a century before 
China adopted this tactic.57 Even though these examples did not involve countertrade 
deals, the same results can occur if a party does not fulfil the promises it makes under 
its countertrade agreement. Given the imbalances inherent to trade deals between 
developing states and powerful economic forces, the end result is often the weaker 
state’s indebtedness to the more powerful state. Congo ought to produce a plausible 
 
52 Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy” (Project Syndicate, 23 January 2017) 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-
chellaney-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog> accessed 27 May 2019 
53 John Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and 
Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective” (Center for Global Development, 2018); China commenced 
the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 to essentially recreate the Silk Road. The Belt and Road Initiative 
aims to create an environment of multimodal transport connectivity and maritime trade links for an 
overall atmosphere of multinational cooperation. In its initial stage, it is dispersing trillions of dollars of 
infrastructure financing through African, Asian, and European countries. 
54 Ibid.; 28 
55 Ibid. 
56 Matt Ferchen, “China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy”, (Carnegie-Tsinghua 
Center for Global Policy, 16 August 2018), <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/08/16/china-
venezuela-and-illusion-of-debt-trap-diplomacy-pub-77089> accessed 27 May 2019; Ferchen notes 
that most of these critics believe that China is practicing neomercantilism and are wary of this practice 
because it could increase China’s geopolitical influence. 
57 Geoffrey Aronson, “China is Playing the West’s Debt Game”, (The Arab Weekly, 7 April 2019) 
<https://thearabweekly.com/china-playing-wests-debt-game> accessed 27 May 2019; see example of 
Western creditors, including French and British bankers, stripping Egypt of its sovereignty fro the 
1870s to 1950s after Egypt’s failure to pay off its debts. 
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plan for maintaining its infrastructure and building its economy before the completion 
of the Sicomines Agreement if it wants to avoid following the same path. 
Countertrade’s Role in Development 
If there is a high enough possibility that countertrade deals between imbalanced 
parties will result in debt for the developing state, why would they engage in such 
deals? The answer is simple: they offer a chance to advance enough to be able to 
eventually compete in the market through conventional trade.58 The golden rule of 
countertrade is to only engage in the practice where “it is absolutely necessary; unless 
no conventional financing method is available or unless real marketing advantages 
accrue from the deal.”59 Many of the countertrade deals to which developing states 
agree only come into fruition because they are unable to follow the orthodox route of 
trade where the conventional means of payment is non-existent, too complex or 
impossible.60 Sometimes, developing states have to revert to countertrade because 
their initial attempts at orthodox trade were rejected by the developed states they 
sought to do business with; this was the case with both Congo and Sri Lanka.61 As a 
result, it is not just goods and services the developing state will hope to gain, but also 
future business cooperation—especially if part of the reason it struggled to trade 
conventionally was because of political or administrative factors.62  
In addition, countertrade allows developing states to promote exports and 
exchange its surplus goods, which the international market may have otherwise 
rejected.63 Countertrade is especially beneficial to overall state development when 
infrastructure is what the developing state will gain from the countertrade deal, as 
“investment in infrastructure projects is essential for the development and economic 
growth of a country.”64 
 
58 Axel Halbach and Rigmar Osterkamp, “Countertrade with Developing Countries: New Opportunities 
for North-South Trade?”, 24 International Economics 17, 17 
59 Rod Rees, “Barter for Beginners” (March 1986) Management Today, 76-77 
60 Laurel Delaney, “Countertrade: The Pros and Cons of A Cashless Trade”, (The Balance Small 
Business, 12 Sept 2018) <https://www.thebalancesmb.com/countertrade-the-pros-and-cons-
1953402>accessed 7 January 2019 
61 Landry (n36) 
62 Delaney (n61); e.g. an embargo 
63 Ibid., 22 
64 Shiravi-Khozani (n2) 41 
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It is unfortunate that so many countertrade deals involving developing states  
deepen the participating developing state’s debt, because debt is not necessarily 
inevitable. What leads states to fall into debt, besides failure to complete their 
contractual commitments, is poor response to marketing problems and an inability to 
maintain the improvements produced through the deal.65 According to Axel Halbach 
and Rigmar Osterkamp, the marketing problems developing states face include: “lack 
of markets for particular goods and services…restrictions on access to potential 
markets; and…lack of foresight.”66 Not only does countertrade help resolve these 
problems, it can also “safeguard the country’s ability to import despite the shortage of 
foreign exchange,”67 which is an advantage that conventional trade does not afford. 
Also, countertrade deals often involve the transfer of services (requiring expertise) and 
technology, which helps advance states that did not already have the technology 
and/or infrastructure. Nevertheless, long-term development is not ensured by securing 
a countertrade deal but by making proactive decisions once the deal has been 
finalised. Though countertrade deals between two developing states tend to work out 
better because of equal bargaining powers, when the deal is between a developing 
state and an economically sound state, it is for the former to ensure that its government 
and domestic workforce gain the necessary skills and expertise to maintain the project. 
The Dark Side of Countertrade 
Despite its positive role in state development, countertrade is undermined by 
the fact that there are “no international uniform rules or any established precedents to 
regulate” such transactions.68 As a result of poor regulation, parties to the transaction 
are presented with a moral dilemma: trade ethically or riddle the countertrade deal with 
corruption, whether through tax evasion, bribery or money laundering. For countries 
like Congo that are afflicted by high levels of corruption, a corruption-riddled 
countertrade deal will only further the state’s socio-political instability and produce a 
higher level of income inequality, stunting the state’s economic potential.69 Despite the 
 
65 Delaney (n61) 
66 Ibid., 
67 Ibid. 
68 Shiravi-Khozani (n2) 7 
69 Ali Kutan, “Does Corruption Hurt Economic Development?: Evidence from Middle Eastern and 
North African and Latin American Countries” in Serdar Sayan (ed), Economic Performance in the 
Middle East and North Africa: Institutions, Corruption and Reform (Routledge 2009), 26 
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existence of domestic rules aimed at combatting corruption, countertrade is still 
regularly abused.70 For this reason, countertrade has received backlash from the 
international community. 
Countertrade Versus the International Community 
The IMF, World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Secretariat view countertrade as “a violation of the principle of global welfare 
maximization inherent in multilateral free trade.”71 Because most Western 
governments, and by extension the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, support these international economic organizations and have officially 
adopted GATT (succeeded by the WTO), they too dismiss countertrade as an attack 
on the very principles of multilateralism, non-discrimination and transparency that they 
uphold.72 Quite the opposite, countertrade epitomises bilateralism, discrimination and 
secrecy.73 
In contrast, more inclusive organizations like the United Nations (UN) and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whose member 
states include developing states, view countertrade more ambivalently.74 Though the 
UN and UNCTAD recognise the risks in countertrade, they view it as the next best 
solution to a state’s trade problems wherever their high expectations cannot be 
realised.75 Either way, on both national and international levels, and even in the ‘Third 
World’, countertrade is “no longer [regarded] as positively and uncritically as the 
current spread of this type of trading arrangement might suggest.”76 It certainly should 
not be regarded “as a permanent solution or even as a welcome instrument for 
reshaping the structure of world trade.”77  
 
70 Ibid., 27 
71 Delaney (n61) 19 
72 Cedric Guyot, “Countertrade Contracts in International Business” (1986) 20 The International 
Lawyer 921, 925 
73 Delaney (n61) 19 
74 Ibid., 20 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
If anything is clear, it is that countertrade is not an easy game to play: “even 
experienced specialists expect, at best, only about one deal in ten to succeed, and 
even the successful transactions can prove more expensive and difficult than 
foreseen.”78 Though a developing state may benefit significantly from countertrade 
deals, there is a high likelihood that states will enter into deep debt. This is too high a 
cost to pay, for debt is what keeps poor states poor.  
Of course, engaging in countertrade may sometimes be an absolute necessity; 
so, in the event that a state has no other avenue of generating cash flow other than 
through countertrade, it should do so. Perhaps for Congo and other developing states 
engaging in countertrade, their deals will actually present a win-win situation for all of 
the parties involved. Or, much to the disapproval of the international community, the 
deals may further perpetuate corruption in those states and present more problems 
than solutions in the future. Nonetheless, whether a given countertrade deal will 
achieve state development will always depend on the specific facts of the case. 
Sometimes the countertrade deal lasts for such a short period of time that it is 
unrealistic to expect a developing state to gain the necessary skills and expertise to 
maintain what they have gained from the deal; or worse, unforeseeable circumstances 
may frustrate the deal. Where a deal is for a long period of time and the parties are 
not in turmoil, it will be up to the participating developing state to use what it has gained 
from the deal (e.g. facilities, new trade relations and markets) to eventually trade 
conventionally. 
  
 
78 Rees (n60), 77 
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